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he great payoff for empirical research is an excellent fit betweentheory and data. The pleasure of the accomplishment is intensified
by its rarity. Social science has been much better at criticism than
validation, at revealing that what we think we know is in fact not so than
in constructing useful models of behavior. It is even more unusual for
research to demonstrate the empirical foundation of conventional wisdom.
Hence one of the rarest experiences of all is to have theory and data
confirm the essential verisimilitude of political folklore. And yet to report
such esoteric findings is the pleasant task of the present paper.
Spatial models of party competition are among those that have not
fared well when juxtaposed to data. Nevertheless, it is commonplace for
scholars, politicians, journalists, and others to analyze politics in spatial
terms. The assumption that parties, policies, and politicians can be located
at a particular point in a space that extends from left to right has long
been current in the idiom of politics. It is not at all strange that the terms
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left and right should be especially relevant in Italy, for Italian parties,
policies, politicians, and voters seem to fit neatly on a single left-right
dimension. Multidimensionality, which often complicates spatial models, is
not a problem. The socioeconomic, religious, and foreign policy dimen-
sions of Italian politics turn out to be mutually reinforcing; they are mere
segments of a basic continuum. At least according to the conventional
wisdom. Before subjecting this contention to closer scrutiny a discussion
of the background of the argument is needed.
SPATIAL MODELS AND ITALIAN POLITICS
In the search for elegance and parsimony in models of political
behavior, students of politics have increasingly turned to the other social
sciences that have pioneered in the search. One such model that has
demonstrated great promise as an aid to abstract understanding of
underlying political processes is derived from the analysis of optimum
location of economic enterprises. Deriving from Harold Hotelling (1929:
41-57) and refined by Arthur Smithies (1941: 423-429), it has been
applied to mass and elite democratic political behavior by Anthony Downs
(1957: esp. ch. 8: 114-141; see also Laponce, 1970; Sartori, 1965).
The model demonstrated that the optimum location of an enterprise in
relation to markets and to competitors would place competing firms near
one another. The familiar analogy is that Woolworth and Kresge are near
one another rather than at opposite ends of Main Street. In an inelastic
market, each would recruit customers from its hinterland; there would be
no likelihood of anyone passing by one store to shop at one further away,
for location would ensure lower costs for customers nearer in space.
It is the merit of Downs (1957) that he has worked out the implications
of this for party competition. Central to Downs’ argument is the
assumption that political parties seek office by adopting policies that will
attract a maximum number of voters. These voters are strung out along a
continuum that reaches from left to right. For Downs the relevant
dimension is the extent of governmental intervention in the economy. The
distribution of voters on that continuum reflects their attitudes toward
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that dimension and dictates the strategies that parties employ to seek
votes. Logically it also determines the number of parties that exist in the
system. The common bell-shaped curve distribution of voters, for example,
encourages a two-party system, with the policies of the two converging
and even overlapping in order to attract the voters in the center. A
bimodal system, on the other hand, suggests a different type of two-party
system, one that is highly polarized and with few shared policy
preferences. A bimodal or multimodal system might logically lead to a
multiparty system. As the curve becomes flatter fewer people would be
occupying an equivalent segment and the difficulty of reconciling the
policy needs of the different segments would increase. This would
encourage the proliferation of parties to appeal to particular segments of
the distribution. Rather than the converging policy preferences in a
two-party system, multiparty systems encourage sharp differentiation of
policies between parties adjacent on the continuum.
Additional discussion of the general patterns of relationships between
party systems and the distribution of opinions would carry us far afield
from our present subject, which is the particular pattern in Italy rather
than a critique of spatial models in general. However, several important
theoretical questions should be noted. One concerns the nature of the
space of the left-right continuum. What does it contain? Is it viewed
similarly by elites and mass? Do different political groups agree on its
composition? Insofar as they relate to spatial models in general these
questions fall outside the province of the present paper. Yet it is necessary
to specify what the space refers to in the present paper. Downs labeled the
space &dquo;ideology,&dquo; which is not the same thing as to define it. His emphasis
was on a single dimension, that of the degree of governmental intervention
in the economy. He seems to use this example as a shorthand for sets of
policy preferences and political orientations consisting of elements that
somehow hang together. The interesting question of why they hang
together is not dealt with; despite its obvious importance, this question
will also be left unresolved in this paper. The sources of ideological
constraint and its dispersal throughout large populations is too large a
subject to discuss briefly. In this paper, consequently, we will deal with
the left-right continuum as it was operationalized in the study-that is, as a
scale on which respondents were asked to place themselves and the parties
of the Italian system. Unlike Downs’ reference to the desired degree of
government intervention in the economy, our left-right dimension is open
in meaning, with only the respondent (if anyone) knowing precisely what
dimension was intended.
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Even if it is possible not to confront directly the question of the
content of the space-and we believe that it is legitimate to avoid this
particular confrontation-it is not so easy to ignore several problems of the
model that derive from assumptions concerning the nature of the space.
These have been analyzed by Donald Stokes as the axioms of unidimen-
sionality, fixed structure, ordered dimensions, and common reference
(Campbell et al., 1966: esp. 165-176). He notes that the unreality of these
axioms as applied to actual polities greatly weakens the appeal of spatial
models. It is our thesis that the axioms do not greatly distort the reality of
Italian politics. A short discussion will clarify the meaning and limitations
of the thesis.
The axiom of unidimensionality posits that a single dimension
dominates the politics of the polity. For Downs this was the degree of
governmental intervention in the economy. As Stokes has pointed out,
other dimensions quite often have been widely viewed as more important,
and in all polities there is some degree of disagreement as to what
constitutes the crucial issues. Religious cleavages have often been as
important as economic ones, for example, and there is no logical or
empirical reason for assuming that the distribution of opinions on one of
these dimensions parallels that on the other. As dimensions are added, the
number of possible combinations of opinions increases rapidly, and there
could be a party to represent each possible combination of opinions. In
practice, not every combination is equally likely to require recognition,
but extant systems illustrate the very large number of parties that can be
generated by a multidimensional politics.
The Italian polity is certainly a case in point. Italians are divided along
the socioeconomic, religious, and foreign policy dimensions plus numerous
less salient ones. However, the multiple cleavages do not cancel out a
strong overall relationship between left-right position and party identifi-
cation. One reason is that the large parties are essentially consistent on the
three major dimensions. That is, the Communists tend to be redistributive,
anticlerical, and anti-American, while the Christian Democrats are less
redistributive, more clerical, and pro-American. Another reason is that
those Italian parties that do not fit so neatly into this spatial model have
few supporters compared to the mass parties that do conform to its
expectations. Finally, the determining dimensions for voters may in reality
be only a subset of those current in political debate. The inquiry into why
the existence of multiple dimensions is compatible with a single left-right
continuum will be taken up again in the paper.
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The axiom of fixed structure suggests that the defmition of the space
remains unchanged. Political reality, however, certainly is not fixed; issues
change, parties surge and decline, political fads come and go. This paper
cannot deal with the question of changes in Italian politics. The data
derive from a single study conducted at a particular moment in time.
Although our study does contain information about prior voting prefer-
ences, change lies outside the scope of the paper. But when an analysis of
voting change in Italy is eventually concluded it will probably demonstrate
considerable stability in individual voting habits in the twenty years
preceding this election in 1968. Preliminary analysis shows that at least
80% of the 1968 electorate claimed to have always voted for the same
party. Considering only the electoral returns, which may, of course, be
misleading, losses and gains of each party are quite small from election to
election. Earlier elections, especially that of 1948, were conducted on the
issue of God against communism. Recent elections have been more prosaic
affairs dealing as much with policy questions as with ideology, at least as
compared with 1948. It is our hunch that the political attitudes of the
individual Italian voter have changed very slightly and only quite slowly in
the past few years. This is only an informed aside; it is certainly not a
prediction of future patterns.
The third axiom, that of ordered dimensions, posits that the parties can
be ranked according to their stand on issues. Stokes, following Kurt
Lewin, distinguishes between &dquo;valence issues,&dquo; which &dquo;merely involve the
linking of the parties with some condition that is positively or negatively
valued by the electorate&dquo; (Campbell et al., 1966: 173), and position issues.
Thus valence issues would not fit the spatial scheme, as all of the parties
might in fact take the same position. Honesty in government, for example,
is not likely to be the monopoly of a single party platform; it might,
however, be the determining factor in an individual’s vote because he feels
that one party would in fact act with more integrity than another. In the
Italian case we uncovered several valence issues such as economic
development of Italy, improvement of schools, and governmental stability.
Analysis indicates that attitudes toward these issues are not as closely
linked with partisan identification as are attitudes toward position issues
on socioeconomic, religious, and foreign policy questions. The evidence
seems clear that in the Italian case in 1968 position rather than valence
issues were determining. Again, we must enter the caveat that we are
discussing a single election.
The final axiom is that of common reference, the possession of
agreement between elites and mass as to the alternatives of governmental
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action. More than the other three, this is a question of degree. It is obvious
that elite and mass do not view the system in exactly the same way
anywhere. It seems equally clear that there is substantial congruence
between the policy preferences of mass publics and elites in Italy, though
it may be due as much to organizational and socialization variables as to
ideology. The differences between Communist elites and voters, for
example, are considerable on a number of dimensions, and the same can be
said of the Christian Democrats. It is less certain that any profound
political consequences flow from these differences. It is doubtful that
complete agreement would make much difference for the political system,
though it might alter the mobilization styles of elites if it were somehow
to be achieved. We are, however, concerned with the existence of
agreement and not its causes and consequences. A further discussion of the
ramifications of the problem of common reference is reserved for a later
point in the paper.
As this is a single study at a particular time, there is little that we can
say about the problem of fixed structure or change in the definition of the
space. Consequently, we will concentrate on the problems of unidimen-
sionality, ordered dimensions, and common elite-mass references. Before
turning to these questions the overall results will be presented.
THE ITALIAN ELECT4RATE: LEFT AND RIGHT
It is the perceptions of mass publics rather than of elites that
complicate most attempts to construct left-right models of party competi-
tion. Although mass publics may not seem to be clearly aware of left-right
dimensions, it is seldom difficult for knowledgeable observers to detect
meaningful gradations among parties along numerous dimensions; and it is
usually possible to reduce these to a summary left-right dimension. Hence
we will begin with the more difficult case-the mass public.
It is not difficult for voters to think in left-right terms in the homeland
of the world’s largest nonruling Communist party-the symbol par
excellence of the left-as well as the cradle of three potent symbols of the
twentieth century right-the Catholic church, the joint stock company,
and fascism. Italy’s history seems to encourage left-right thinking. Patterns
of social stratification and the resulting elitism have exacerbated cleavages
originating in both agricultural and industrial societies, and their historical
legacies are a body politic sharply divided by ideology and social class. The
early dominance of the country by the Liberals, the rise of Marxian
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socialism and its subsequent fragmentation, the mobilization of Catholics
into a mass party that in part transcends class dimensions, and the survival
of Fascist sympathies gave rise to parties holding the present loyalties of
more than 95% of the voters. The result is three voting blocs easily
identifiable by most Italian voters-the left, right, and Catholic, the last
being in fact, as we will see, a center bloc.
The left consists of the Communist party (PCI, using its Italian initials);
a splinter Socialist party that is close to the PCI, the Socialist party of
Proletarian Unity (PSIUP); at the time of the research the unified socialist
party PSI-PSDI, which has since divided again into the Italian Socialist
party (PSI) and the Unitary Socialist party (PSU); and the small
Republican party (PRI), which carried on an older anticlerical but
non-Marxian leftist tradition. The Christian Democratic party (DC)
occupies the center of the spectrum. The right consists of the Liberal party
(PLI), the Monarchists (MON), and Neofascists (MSI). National samples
consistently underrepresent the Communist vote; though less seriously
than in most studies, the present analysis also suffers from this problem.
Table 1 gives the percentage of the vote received by each party in 1968
and the percentage of respondents who identified with the party. The DC
and &dquo;other&dquo; are overrepresented, but the missing PCI identifiers
constitute the most serious problem. Careful evaluation of the nonidenti-
fiers demonstrates that they do not mask more than slightly more than the
normal portion of these missing PCI identifiers. There is no evidence that
the distortion that inevitably results from the low portion of PCI
TABLE 1
PARTY VOTE AND SAMPLE PORTION
Source of electoral results: Derek W. Urwin, ed., Elections in Western Nations,











































identifiers affects our overall findings, though it cannot be demonstrated
that it does not.
National Italian political mores and the professional ethics of the
interviewers precluded asking respondents how they voted in the previous
election. Instead, respondents were asked: &dquo;To which party do you
habitually feel closest?&dquo; plus questions dealing with consistency of voting,
past voting behavior, closeness to party, and so on. As almost 80% claimed
to have always voted for the same party, the fit between party
identification and vote must be very close; but, given the uncertainties
associated with recalled behavior, it should not be assumed.
The elites are 396 municipal councilors from a national sample of
communes. Interviews were obtained with two Communist, two Socialist
and two Christian Democratic councilors in each commune.
There would be virtually no disagreement among observers of Italian
politics on the ranking of parties in Table 1; and, as we shall see, the mass
and elites concur. In order to tap perceptions of the parties on the
left-right continuum we asked respondents to place parties on a scale from
the extreme left to the extreme right (that is, 0 to 100) that they had
previously been able to identify. We also asked them to place themselves
on the scale. Of the total voter sample, 76% were able to place themselves
on the left-right continuum; the portion ranged from a maximum of 97%
for the PLI identifiers to a low of 79% for the DC. Only 47% of the
nonidentifiers could locate themselves on the scale. There are many
confirmations of the fit between left-right placement and party identifica-
tion. The ranking of the parties is similar to their placement by expert
opinion, though it has been achieved by respondents of a country with a
low level of formal education at the mass level and little claimed interest in
politics. The overall elite ranking is similar to the overall mass ranking,
though the numbers assigned the parties differ somewhat, especially on the
right. This is in part due to the weight of the Socialists and Communists in
the elite ranking, and to the absence of right-wing councilors in the elite
sample.
The overall relationship between left-right self-placement and party
identification at the mass level is very strong. The product moment
correlation is .65, tau beta is .63 and gamma .77. Examination of the
distribution of the mass electorate will help to redefine our understanding
of several aspects of the Italian system. Table 2 shows the overall
distribution of left-right self-placement and the distribution of the
individual parties.
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Figure 1: LEFT-RIGHT SELF-REPLACEMENT
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The most striking observation is the strong resemblance between the
Christian Democratic distribution and that of the mass sample as a whole
(see Figure 1). Of course, the sample somewhat overrepresents the DC and
underrepresents the PCI and the right. Undoubtedly a better sample would
reveal a somewhat stronger right and a considerably stronger extreme left,
not to mention a less exaggerated center. However, it is unlikely that the
general shape of the area under the curve would change greatly. The DC
dominates the area in which the bulk of the electorate is to be found,
which is not surprising considering that the party has ruled for a
quarter-century.
It is also clear that the Italian electorate in 1968 was skewed to the left.
The center-left formula thus certainly seems to reflect the distribution of
opinion. The right, though well represented in parties, is weak in numbers.
But its existence is a prerequisite for the center position of the DC. The
Italian system does not appear to be highly polarized in left-right terms
perhaps because the mass electorate’s perception of the location of the
three right-wing parties causes the DC to be viewed as a center party. If the
composition of the space were to change, if the perspective were to be
foreshortened by the elimination of the right, so to speak, then the DC
might be viewed in quite different terms. Perhaps the same change could
result from the emergence of a new force on the extreme left, one that
would disrupt the current hold of the PCI on that position and push that
party toward the center. But this is speculation. The historical memory of
fascism, the existence of a Neofascist party and other clear Conservative
parties, and perhaps other forces not yet isolated and analyzed placed the
DC squarely in the center in 1968. In terms of the distribution of left-right
perspectives at that time, the center-left formula seemed attuned to
political realities.
THE PROBLEM OF DIMENSIONS
It is obvious that Italian politics does not revolve around a single, neatly
ordered dimension. Many issues have historically been important in Italian
politics and most of them are still current in debate. They surge and
decline in importance, but few are resolved and fewer disappear. The
existence of a number of parties is itself good evidence that there is more
than one issue; for, though it is possible for several parties to exist based
on advocacy of different magnitudes of a single issue, it is highly unlikely.
Hence we must reconcile the existence of multiple issues with the single
left-right dimension.
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An initial point that will simplify the problem is to point out that many
issues responsible for the existence of minor parties seem to attract the
attention of few voters. The parties of the left are anticlerical; the DC is
proclerical; the right is much less clerical than the DC, but it attracts
relatively few votes and hence attenuates only slightly the strong
association between left and right and sympathy for the clergy. Similar
dynamics hold for foreign policy, in which, for example, the MON and
MSI are less pro-American than the parties to the immediate left of them.
Thus it is possible for strong relationships to emerge even when the parties
of the right revert toward the attitudes of the left on many variables.
Taking the above phenomenon into account, it is remarkable the extent to
which the left and the center, which are our two largest groups, represent
opposite positions on most issues of public policy. A factor analysis of
policy attitudes revealed that attitudes toward two socioeconomic issues,
clericalism, and foreign policy form a single factor. On these dimensions
(socioeconomic issues, clericalism, and foreign policy) the major blocs of
left and center are at opposite poles. Hence the problem of conflicting
dimensions is largely avoided by their coincidence, at least in this election.
The placement of himself on a left-right scale seems not to confuse the
respondent. Most seem to find little conflict among the dimensions.
That left-right placement is a better predictor of party identification
than is any single issue or combination of issue dimensions is demonstrated
by a stepwise multiple regression analysis. In order to meet better the
assumptions of interval data the 0-100 self-placement of respondents on
scales of sympathy toward clerics, unions, and Americans was used instead
of the ordinal level responses to the policy questions. Left-right placement
alone accounts for 42.8% of the total variance. Attitudes toward clerics
adds an additional 5.7%; attitudes toward unions explain an additional
2.9% beyond that; attitudes toward Americans adds a final 1.2% for a total
variance explained of 52.6%.
ORDERED DIMENSIONS
Ordered dimensions, it will be recalled, refers to the characteristic of a
dimension that parties may be assigned different positions on it.
&dquo;Position&dquo; issues can be so ranked while &dquo;valence&dquo; issues cannot. A large
number of issues were investigated; we can place them into these two
categories and look at their relationship to partisan identification.
Our procedure is to determine which are the issues that people say are
important to them and then investigate which are the ones that in fact are
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highly associated with partisan identification. We will assume that the
issues that are really the important ones in determining the respondent’s
identification are the ones that he associates with his party. Thus we asked
whether certain things were important to the respondent and later asked
which party struggled the most to achieve these things.
Three issues turned out to be important for everyone. These were the
economic development of Italy, the development of education, and
governmental stability. These are typical valence issues, things that are
favored generally with most people seeing their own party as the one that
struggles the most to achieve them. But when the strength of the
relationship between party identification and perception of which party
struggles the most for the issue is examined it is obvious that these are not
the issues that distinguish among the parties. Table 3 demonstrates this.
The position issues, on the other hand, show a diminishing relationship
between ID and perception as the issue recedes in importance, as would be
expected if the issue is an important one in party choice. That is, the
relationship between ID and the perception that one’s own party is the
one that struggles most to achieve it is strongest for those for whom the
issue is most important. It seems clear that the position issues are the ones
that differentiate among the parties. One thus feels justified in acknowl-
TABLE 3
PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION AND &dquo;WHICH PARTY
STRUGGLES THE MOST TO...&dquo; BY IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE
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edging that valence issues exist in Italian politics while insisting that they
are not very important in determining how people vote. They are
ephemera, a halo that attaches to a party that is chosen on other grounds.
We may conclude, consequently, that it is the ordered dimensions that
count in Italian politics.
Additional evidence of the fit between ordered dimensions and party is
found in the strong relationship between score on a policy index and party
identification. The policy index was formed by taking the issue items
identified in the factor analysis mentioned above and converting the sum
of each respondent’s answers into a single unweighted score. The index
includes one clerical, one foreign policy, and two socioeconomic items.
Respondents were asked whether they agreed strongly, agreed, disagreed,
or disagreed strongly with the following statements: &dquo;We ought to stop
financing Catholic schools and spend more money for state schools,&dquo; &dquo;the
foreign policy of Italy ought to be completely independent of the United
States,&dquo; &dquo;Capitalism poses a threat for Italy,&dquo; and &dquo;in the division of the
national income, workers are really in a disadvantageous position.&dquo; The
overall relationship is strong; tau beta is .40 and gamma is .55. Table 4
shows the breakdown by party. The poor fit on the right is apparent, as
¡ are the large number of Christian Democrats without strongly voiced
opinions.
Confidence in the overall results is increased when the strength of the
relationship is examined for categories of respondents who have indicated
varying degrees of closeness to their party. The closer their ties to the
party the stronger the relationship, with party members exhibiting the
strongest relationships of all (see Table 5).
TABLE 4
PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND POLICY POSITION
Percentage of Each Party’s Identifiers Taking Left-to-Right Positions
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TABLE 5
CLOSENESS TO PARTY AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ID
AND POLICY POSITION (6Would you say that you feel
very dose to this party, more or less dose, or not very dose?&dquo;)
COMMON ELITE-MASS REFERENCES
The assumption of common elite-mass perceptions of political issues is
the easiest of all to demonstrate for Italy-up to a point. The structure of
political conflict ensures that only the most poorly informed are unaware
of the positions of the politicians and parties on the major issues. But
there are many poorly informed members of the electorate.2 There are
also internal differences on some issues within some parties that affect the
fit between issue position and party identification. Finally, the elite
measures are based on members of only the three largest parties, and these
are the ones that best fit the model.
The relationship between elite and mass perceptions can be summarized
as follows: the elite are like the mass, only more so. The elite hold in an
exaggerated form the opinions of the mass. Or perhaps the mass hold in
attenuated form the opinions of the elite. For the relationship between
opinion and party is much stronger for the elite than for the mass, and it is
strikingly so in the dimensions that have been demonstrated to be
extremely important for determining behavior, the clerical and socio-
economic areas. Unfortunately, as it was a communal elite being
interviewed, we unwisely omitted the question dealing with foreign policy.
As we will demonstrate below by other means, the findings undoubtedly
hold for this dimension as well.
Table 6 presents the overall relationships between opinion and party
identification for the elite and for the mass. Stability is much more
strongly associated with party among the elite than the mass; otherwise
the spread between elite and mass opinion is not remarkable, taking into
account the caveats uttered above.
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TABLE 6
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTY IDENTIFICATION
AND VARIOUS
Top Line = Elite (PCI, PSI-PSDI, DC)
Middle Line = Mass (PCI, PSI-PSDI, DC only)
Bottom Line in ( ) = Mass (all parties)
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We also have a complete set of affect scores for the elite and mass (table
not shown). These report the degree of sympathy for various groups and
countries on a 0-100 scale, with 50 representing neutral affect. The scores
of elite and mass are close together, and in almost every case the mass
scores regressed toward the national mean; that is, the mass opinions were
less extreme than the elite. The exceptions are themselves of great interest,
for they touch the sensitive issues of the system. These are the cases in
which the opinions of a party’s identifiers are further from the all-party
mass mean than are elite opinions. There were 15 objects of sympathy and
3 parties, for a total of 45 cases. In all but 6 cases the mass regressed
toward the mean; all 6 involved the Christian Democrats, and they all
touched on aspects of the ideological debate that has served for so long as
a vehicle of mass mobilization for the DC. The DC mass identifiers are
more proclerical (73 to 61) than the elite, more pro-American (61 to 57),
less sympathetic to the Russians (20 to 24), less sympathetic to the
PSI-PSDI (46 to 52), less sympathetic to unions (60-64), and more
sympathetic to big businessmen (47 to 43).
This indicates that DC elites work under considerable constraints in the
opening to the left, and that they are in fact ahead of their electorate in
moving toward the national mean. Note, however, that the spread between
elite and mass is small; it is only the direction of the difference, not its
magnitude, that merits attention. In most cases the spread between elite
and mass is much greater for the PCI and PSI-PSDI, but in these parties the
mass always regresses toward the national mean. It is in fact probably the
extremism of the elites of the two leftist parties that accounts for the
consistent regression of their mass identifiers toward the national mean. In
the case of the DC, however, the errant choices of the mass cannot be
explained away by the general phenomenon that extremes regress toward
the mean on remeasurement or in larger populations. Though small, the
differences in perception on general affect questions do seem to have
important implications. But as we have seen they are not translated into
differences between elite and mass in policy preferences.
CONCLUSIONS
From the foregoing it is clear that spatial models of politics correspond
nicely with the reality world of the Italian electorate as it has been
operationalized in this study. Unless one holds impossibly high standards
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as to what constitutes a good fit, the relationship between theory and data
is very strong indeed.
This fmding has implications for a wide range of considerations.
Probably the most important is that it demonstrates that multiple
dimensions of political conflict originating in diverse ages and circum-
stances need not be overlapping. For Italian political conflict reflects many
issue dimensions that are not historically necessarily connected, though we
have shown them to be in fact closely related. As new issues have arisen
they tend to have been superimposed along the lines of old cleavages
rather than crisscrossing them.
This is not to claim that cross-cutting cleavages do not exist. The
difficulties between the center and right illustrate the dynamics of political
conflict in Italy. The Liberals were traditionally an anticlerical party and
they are still less clerical than the Christian Democrats. But because of the
challenge of the left as well as other reasons this issue is played down
today and the anticlerical aspect of liberalism has lost its political saliency.
Another example is nationalism: the MSI is quite nationalist, but the
importance of other conflicts in Italian politics keeps the party from being
as anti-American as the leftist parties. In a similar way, issues originating in
the counterreformation, the industrial revolution, and the cold war are
transformed into poles of a single left-right scale.
If the issue dimensions of Italian politics were as clear-cut as suggested
above there would be little reason for the multiparty system. Yet it is clear
that voter opinions support such a system and, indeed, perhaps require it.
For it is the large parties that fit the model best and it is the size of their
electorates that makes the relationships so strong. Due to their size they
are able in large part to define the issues and to impose their definitions on
the electorate. And these are the issues that we have studied. There are
many other issues in Italian politics that we have not tapped. It is not
obvious that the lines of cleavage on these would be the same as those we
have examined. Many have argued that the issues analyzed herein, which
are certainly important in political debate, are irrelevant for the real issues
of contemporary Italian society. And they may be correct. However, these
old issues were still very much alive at the time of the research. Whether
they will continue to be dominant in the minds of voters cannot be
predicted with confidence. Their anchorage in the mass parties and the
. stow pace of change in Italian politics suggest that they may be around for




1. The data are based on a multistage national sample of 3,000, of whom 2,500
were interviewed, for a response rate of 83%. The interviews were administered by
CISER of Rome in June 1968.
2. This is perhaps the reason why the perceptions of the Monarchist identifiers fit
so poorly with the conventional wisdom: they are the most uninformed and
clientelistic of the party identifiers. It is likely that the conventional wisdom’s
placement of the party reflects accurately the attitudes of its elite. Unfortunately, we
have no measures of MON elite attitudes to confirm or deny this hunch.
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